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Abstract
The paper takes the stand that the central banks as nancial regulators have their own interest in
imposing more regulations. It models the institutional behaviour for the central bank and government
using the Indirect Inference testing and estimation method as it nds a set of coe¢ cients of the model
that can generate the actual observed behaviour for the US. The paper establishes that good monetary
policy can reduce instability. Regulation at worse destabilises the economy and at best contributes little
to stabilise the economy. After the nancial crisis, nancial regulations were too severe and thus actually
increased instability.
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Since the recent nancial crisis central banks have been given more responsibilities as nancial regulators
for macro-prudential supervision. The idea is that since they conduct monetary policy, they are in the per-
fect position to observe macroeconomic developments and therefore anticipate threats to nancial stability.
Financial stability a¤ects price stability and the monetary policy transmission process to the point that
central banks recognise that they cannot ignore it (Blinder, 2010; Goodhart and Schoemaker, 1995). The
justication for this nancial stability agenda arises from the social e¤ects of bank failures. First, banks are
supposed to mitigate an asymmetric information problem between savers and borrowers. But if they fail,
borrowers are left without credit which cannot be replaced from other sources. Second, a banks failure can
cause nancial contagion, as the lenders doubt the health of the nancial system and withdraw deposits.
Lastly, the cost of default on small depositors is considered to be politically intolerable. Thus the aim of
these nancial stability regulations is to o¤set the market failures caused by the existence of monopoly power,
externalities and information asymmetries, and thus enhance social welfare.
Traditionally, if we followed the public interest approach to regulations, we would believe that in their
role as a nancial regulator, central banks would wish to conduct their regulatory operations in the most
e¢ cient manner without political and personal bias. However, this ignores the possibility that concentrating
more supervisory powers in the hands of central bankers could make them more prone to be manipulated by
the banking industry itself or to pursue other objectives, such as political power or bureaucratic and other
private rewards. The public choice approach based on private interest (Stigler, 1971) argues that regulators
do not maximise social welfare but rather their own welfare. Buchanan (1980) argued that individuals who
behave selshly in markets can hardly behave wholly altruistically in political life. These researchers show
that we cannot take for granted that regulators will act in the interests of society as whole. It is a possibility
that regulators abuse their power and force banks to divert the ow of credit to satisfy the private interests of
regulators. The more power the regulator has, the less e¢ cient the banking system and the more corruption
in the lending process (Barth et al, 2004; Quintyn and Taylor, 2002). Barth et al. (2006) concluded that
Stigler and Buchanan were correct: the structure of banking regulation and policy in most of the world
ultimately benets the private interests of government o¢ cials and bankers.
In this paper we explore this public choice approach to central banks and question the idea that they are
benevolent pursuers of the public interest. We note that the nancial crisis starting in 2007 was preceded by
a credit boom that central banks could have avoided; that the Lehman crisis itself could have been prevented
by concerted central bank action; and that the period of recovery from the crisis was hampered by a surge
in bank regulation that prevented credit expansion. This triple failure of central banks sits poorly with the
idea that they were devoted to the public-spirited aims of preventing and ameliorating the crisis.
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We build a theoretical model of the regulative behaviour of the central bank; we estimate and test
this model against the raw data. From the policy viewpoint we question the appropriateness of rigid and
aggressive regulatory control of the nancial system, and ask whether it is the only way to reduce future
nancial instability. The analysis that we make, based on the public choice approach, assumes that regulators
have their own interests which they maximise. We model the choices made by the central bank and the
government subject to their constraints: the Institutional Model. We combine this institutional behaviour
with a macroeconomic model for the US to analyse whether the Institutional Model we propose here was
likely to have generated the actual institutional behaviour that we observe in the data  using the Indirect
Inference method to check this match between model simulated behaviour and data behaviour. As far as we
are aware this is the rst attempt to model regulatory behaviour and how regulation is formed as well as its
impact on macroeconomic stability, and provide empirical support for such a model.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 presents the model for the choices made by the central
bank and the government. Section 2 shows how, according to our model of the US, di¤erent policy choices
in monetary policy and regulation a¤ect overall economic stability. Section 3 constructs our Institutional
Model to conform qualitatively with these relationships and estimates and tests the resulting model by
Indirect Inference. Section 4 concludes.
1 Modelling regulation
1.1 How to model the private interest of central banks?
We follow the approach of Niskanen (1971). He assumed that regulators seek to maximise their private
utilities. If they could, they would use the regulations and their power to increase their income, but due to
the nature of their job as civil servants, they cannot exploit the market to raise income. Therefore, they
resort to maximising utility from pursuing non-pecuniary goals such as prestige, reputation, an expansion of
authority and power, feelings of control, their salary, and a greater budget to spend. Most of these factors
are related to the size of the agency. We can generalise this argument to nancial regulators and thus to
central banks. We therefore model the central bank as aiming to maximise the size of the agency by imposing
more nancial regulations in order to obtain the biggest non-pecuniary benets. This behaviour leads to
an excessive number of regulative o¢ cials and an excessive volume of regulations. These in turn result in
ine¢ ciency. It is easy to think of a regulator as a monopolist. If the regulator is free to set the price for
its service, it would set the level where the total revenue is maximised. However, it cannot choose the price
because the price is the cost per unit of service delivered, so to increase the revenue it increases the size and
thus decreases the e¢ ciency. We have to note that the growth in regulatorssize is only possible because
politicians have their own interest in allowing this to happen. That is, the size of a regulator is positively
correlated with the extent of regulations, as motivated by the regulators private interests. Across developed
countries, there is evidence that central banks as regulators either reduced or did not aggressively raise their
size prior to the nancial crisis, but since then they have almost all increased the numbers of their employees
(Figure 1).
1.2 How to model the relationship between social welfare and regulation?
On the other hand, nancial regulators need to care also about how their regulations impact on the macro-
economic and nancial environment, since without a reasonable impact their role will be put at risk. Their
ultimate goal for society needs to be to maintain stability in ination and output which can be achieved partly
through nancial stability. Therefore, from the welfare-maximising point of view, a central bank also has to
ensure nancial stability. In the literature, it is common to nd the assumption and also the conclusion that
the more banking regulation there is, the better nancial stability, and thus better welfare (Brunnermeier
and Sannikov, 2016). This rationale can be understood with an example of the most widely-used form of
macro-prudential regulation, capital adequacy requirements. Capital serves as a bu¤er against losses, and
hence failure, and it is important when deposit insurance is in place. The idea is that due to asymmetric
information in the nancial market, depositors are faced with an adverse selection problem: they have a high
incentive to withdraw funds all at once in the event of bad news which can result in a bank run. Deposit
insurance acts like a safety net to stop this from happening, but it creates a moral hazard problem as banks
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have an incentive to increase risk taking. Capital requirements ensure that banks maintain costly capital
against risky assets to o¤set this moral hazard (Berger, Herring and Szego, 1995; Kaufman, 1991; Furlong
and Keeley, 1989; Keeley and Furlong, 1990). Tayler and Zilberman (2016) advocated macroprudential pol-
icy in the form of Basel III that focused on forcing banks to increase the quality of their assets, to raise the
capital/asset ratio and to hold countercyclical capital bu¤ers. They argue this macroprudential approach is
optimal and better than the use of Taylor Rules in a period of nancial distress. It can deliver both nancial
and economic stability.
However, this view is disputed. For example, Kahane (1977), Koehn and Santomero (1980), Kim and
Santomero (1988), Besanko and Katanas (1996) and Blum (1999) argue that capital requirements can lead
to an increase in bank risk taking behaviour  to o¤set the cost of the extra capital imposed on normal
banking activity, given that it is extraordinarily di¢ cult for regulators to set capital standards that mimic
those that would be demanded by well informed, undistorted private market agents. Thus, more regulations
can create more risk and a wider credit spread, with negative e¤ects on nancial stability and ultimately on
welfare.
For example, higher capital requirements can force capital decient banks to raise signicant amounts of
capital, which might not be their optimal level. This means that their capital structure is now sub-optimal
and their value falls. With higher capital holding they will have less ability to get deposit insurance subsidies.
Altogether this leads to a higher cost of capital. Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) argue that bank equity is
uniquely costly, and that this cost comes from the role of demand deposits as an e¢ cient means of exchange:
forcing banks to increase capital means that in general equilibrium, consumers must hold more bank equity
 the less preferred medium of exchange  in aggregate and therefore demand a higher expected return on
equity in compensation, so raising the cost of capital.
Another form of regulation is a tax levied on banks. Banks take deposits and pay an interest rate on
them. These deposits are used to produce loans for which the bank charges a loan interest rate. The banks
prot margin on a loan is determined by the spread between the loan rate and the deposit rate (plus default
and other costs). Therefore, any tax imposed on the bank will be borne not only by the bank (by accepting
lower prots), but also the depositors (by paying a lower interest rate on deposits), and/or the borrowers
(by charging them higher interest rates on loans). Either way, the market is distorted.
1.3 A way to look at these choices
We are dealing here with strategic choices made by the government and the central bank, to whom two main
tasks are delegated: a monetary rule and the management of macro-prudential policy. The latter policy
involves signicant internal organisation by the central bank in a way that is simply unobservable to the
outside world including government. We can only observe the results in the form of stability (the inverse of
the economys variability) and the total size of the central bank bureaucracy.
There is a model of the economy which all can consult: we will assume it is like the one we set out in
Le et al. (2016)  the widely-used Smets and Wouters (2007) model with various extensions to deal with
banks, the zero lower bound, the monetary base and Quantitative Easing (QE), which we found could t
the data behaviour well on our Indirect Inference test1 . From this model of the economy we would like to
construct a model of institutional behaviour, which we will call our Institutional Model  the main focus of
this paper. Using this model, we can discover the e¤ects of di¤erent monetary rules on Stability (S), given
the overall size of the Central Bank (P , for its Power); we do this from our simulations of the model for
di¤erent monetary rules. We can also discover the e¤ects of P on S by positing a macro-prudential Rule
that focuses on the credit premium, pm. We can do this as follows.
In order to include regulation in our model of the economy to allow for the analysis of the e¤ects of such
policy on the economy, we review the credit premium equation. The pm function depends on model variables
including the monetary base, mt; and also an error term, t; plus a regulation error term, t:
pmt = f(mt) + t + t:
Now assume that t becomes an explicit macro-prudential instrument targeted on pm as: t = t where
 is the level of the importance and resources given by the government to the regulatory function and
1The model is relatively familiar and standard, therefore we do not set out in detail, but list the equations in the Appendix.
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t =  (pmt) + t where  ; which lies between zero and
1
 ; is the response size of macro-prudential policy to
the premium and  represents the associated error with a certain variance, 2 . All together the premium is
pmt =
1
1   ff(mt) + t + tg
the total error term is therefore 11  (t + t): So far we have assumed that regulations have direct e¤ects
on the credit premium. However, they should also have indirect e¤ects because regulations might cause
changes in the nancial markets that in turn impact the credit premium. To model this, we assume that
the change in regulations that is uncorrelated to the response in credit premium, would create some extra
noise in the nancial markets and eventually a¤ect the credit premium. The idea is that at the minimum
level of regulation ( = 0) ; there is no extra noise, but deviating from this minimum, there is more volatility.
Therefore, the function is
t = g()t
so that the credit premium function is
pmt =
1
1   ff(mt) + t + g()tg
with the total error equals 11  [1 + g()]t. This premium function says that scaling up regulations is
associated with rising power (P ) and this results in rising the size of macro-prudential responses via 11  
and also the associated variance of its error t + g()t: The functional form for the g function is chosen to
yield the shape of our Policy Function for the Institutional Model. This Policy Function shows stability (S)
is a function of power (P ) and the monetary rule (M). Its derivation is based of the following rationales.
We can simulate a rising power (P ) in our model by raising  steadily: we should nd that beyond a
certain point stability declines as the error variance rises and dominates the stabilising e¤ect of  : What we
have here is a La¤er Curve in P and S. Two levels of P can deliver the same S; the organisation can grow
and take more macro-prudential action to create S but with increasing ine¢ ciency. On the other hand, we
can also measure our Monetary Rules (M) in terms of e¤ectiveness in increasing stability (S): in Le et al.
(2016) we found that there was a clear ranking of rules in terms of type and size of responses of monetary
instruments. The Taylor rule was found to be the least stabilising, while price level targeting or nominal
GDP targeting rules with or without monetary reforms delivered more stability. We arrange these in order of
stability as a measureM . Together, our model of the economy gives us the following type of Policy Function:
S = a+ bM + cP   dP 2   2E
where M is a continuous schedule of possible monetary rules of increasing power to increase S, and 2E is
the error variance, representing the ambient noise in the economy. We can think of the latter term as from
time to time shifting, as it did upwards in the nancial crisis and downwards during the Great Moderation.
When these shifts occur there is a shift in the institutional equilibrium.
So far we have modelled the e¤ects of power (P ) and the monetary rule (M) on stability (S). We now
set up an Institutional Model where we address the question of how these power and monetary setup are
chosen in the rst place. They must be the outcomes of some optimisation problems. To capture these
choices, we now introduce the two sets of preferences, of society/government: US = f(S; P;M) where P
enters negatively as a resource cost and M also enters negatively because increasing the stabilising e¤ect
requires a nite governmental e¤ort to persuade the policy maker that the monetary rule must be changed to
a more interventionist level: so that dUsdS > 0;
dUs
dP < 0;
dUs
dM < 0; and of the central bank UB = f(S; P ) where
now P enters positively because the central bank enjoys higher levels of power so that dUBdS > 0;
dUB
dP > 0.
In both cases we assume well-behaved second derivatives. These two deciding institutions maximise their
utility subject to their constraints.
The maximisation proceeds in a sequence. First, the government chooses M and target P and S(i.e.
what it thinks P and S should be according to the Policy Function) to maximise its utility w.r.t. S; P;M
subject to the Policy Function for S. This situation is illustrated in Figure 2.
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The government then can enforce the delivery of M by passing a law mandating this monetary rule,
which it can monitor from observable policy actions and economy outcomes. Next, the government delegates
the organisation of regulation to the central bank. Now it cannot monitor the technical operations or size
of the central bank e¤ectively because it does not know the central banks production functionin which
regulatory activity and size delivers stability. The central bank maximises its utility, taking M as given but
subject again to the Policy Function. Because it enjoys power it now proceeds to choose a location where
it delivers both stability and power. In e¤ect it goes over the La¤er Curve maximum pointonto the other
side to achieve stability and, for it, an acceptable amount of power. This is illustrated in Figure 3.
One may ask why the government permits this choice? The answer is that the government (of politicians)
cannot carry out these functions without delegating them to a bureaucracy, here the central bank, as the
relevant group of bureaucrats. It cannot gauge the e¢ ciency of the central banks operations. It can observe
central bank size and stability, and it knows the modelas it did in order to optimise its choice of monetary
rule. But the Policy Function is subject to an error variance, which can change; and it cannot prove in
the public domain that the same stability can be achieved at lower size in practice, as implied by its (true)
model. We appeal here to the politics of delegation and bureaucracy: that politicians have no instrument
to force the bureaucracy to be e¢ cient, because of asymmetric information2 . In e¤ect the government can,
by choosing the best M , force the central bank to limit its use of P because the La¤er Curve maximum is
shifted by a good M far over to the left. Plainly the more e¤ective monetary policy is at stabilising the
economy the less need there is for macro-prudential regulation and the less easy it is for the central bank to
justify a large size for its bureaucracy.
Thus out of this model comes a choice of M by the government and a subsequent choice of P; S by the
Bank, given M . These choices are dictated by the Policy Function whose parameters here are estimated
from our model of the economy above. We can set up the Institutional Model formally as follows. The
governments utility function is written as:
UG = S
  M   kP
where k > 0 <  < 1 < :
It maximises this subject to the policy function for stability:
S = a+ bM + cP   0:5dP 2   2E
where a; b; c; d are all positive.
Maximising the Lagrangian UG   S; it nds the rst order conditions as follows:
0 =
dL
dS
= S 1   
0 =
dL
dM
=  M 1 + b
0 =
dL
dP
=  k + (c  dP )
The solutions for M and P are:
M = (
b

)
1
 1S 
1 
 1
P =
c
d
  k
d
S1 :
2This is a point well understood by powerful Treasuries, such as HM Treasury. They can only achieve e¢ ciency for a ministry
by cutting its budget, and thereby forcing it to manage its resources e¤ectively at the cost of failing in its tasks. Even then it
risks losing the battle in the court of public opinion because the ministry will cut the most popular functions rst to make its
case against cuts. Thus it is reported that Daniel Barenboim, director of the Berlin State Opera, some years back fended o¤ a
10% cut on his huge budget from the bankrupt Berlin Region by saying 10%? Then there will be no opera: 90% of my budget
is overheads and cannot be cut!
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It follows that as S falls,M and P both rise. The solution for the total di¤erential evaluated at S = P = 1
is:
dS =  [1 + b(b=) 1 1 1  
   1 + (c  d)(k=d)(1  )]
 1d2E
so that dM
d2E
> 0 and dP
d2E
> 0:
We note that only M is determined by this choice. P is delegated to the central bank, which is forced to
follow the chosen M but is free to choose its own optimal P . Its utility function is written as:
UCB = S
 + P
where  > 1 and which it maximises subject to the same policy function. Maximising its Lagrangean
L = UCB   S it nds the rst order conditions:
0 =
dL
dS
= S 1   
0 =
dL
dP
= + (c  dP )
The solution for P is:
P =
c
d
+

d
S ( 1)
so that dPdS =

d (1 )S  < 0; i.e. more instability is associated with more power. That is, power is assumed
to be very attractive, so that the marginal utility of power is higher than the marginal utility of stability.
Now we note that the actual solution for P is given by the central banks choices. When we substitute
these into the policy function to nd S, we obtain the new total di¤erential, evaluated at S = P = 1, as:
dS =  [1 + b(b=) 1 1 1  
   1 + (c  d)(=d)(  1)]
 1d2E
So, once both government and central bank have acted, we obtain the result that a rise in the volatility
of the environment raises M and P but still causes a fall in stability, S.
We obtain the following observable outcomes for institutions as functions of the environmental volatility
(with signs of the rst derivatives):
M = f(2E+)
P = f(2E+)
S = f(2E )
It is these functions we would like to check in the data. In terms of the Indirect Inference method we
will be using for our empirical work these functions are the auxiliary model to be found in data regressions
or in observed data moments.
However, rst we must consider whether the key Policy Function for S that we have assumed in our
Institutional Model can be generated by our Underlying Model of the economy. We now turn to this issue.
1.4 Does the Underlying Model imply a Policy Function for S of the type
assumed in the Institutional Model?
With the Institutional Model in mind, which established how regulations a¤ect the economy, we now use the
underlying model of the economy to run experiments for di¤erent levels of regulation under each monetary
regime. Our objective is to get a measure of the relationship between the monetary policy regime (M), the
amount of regulation (P ) and the degree of stability in the economy (S) in di¤erent data episodes.
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We identify various monetary regimes: the original (Taylor Rule), reformed (strong Quantitative Easing
policy), nominal GDP targeting (NGDPT) with/without reform, and price level targeting (PLT) with/without
reform. Also we have a model of the e¤ects of the macro-prudential instrument for the credit premium:
pmt =
1
1  ff(mt)+ t + tg, with the total error term 11  (t + t) = 11  [1 + g()]t: We choose
1 + g() to be f1 + 2   4:5gt. The idea is that before the crisis, regulation was at its minimum, but as
regulation starts rising above this minimal level the noise rises as some function of :
We want to see how under this model of US regulation di¤erent monetary rules and di¤erent regulative
intensity a¤ect economic stability, which we measure by the frequency of crises, or their length and severity.
We simulate the model many times and then calculate how many crises there are in these simulations. We
dene a crisis as a drop in GDP that takes at least 3 years to recover from. Table 1 reports how many
crises occur every 1000 years as well as the average length and depth of the crises for the di¤erent monetary
rules and level of regulation. We nd that when there is no regulation ( = 0), the economy with just
a monetary regime of Taylor Rule experiences the highest frequency of crisis. This can be mitigated if
we adopt other alternative monetary regimes. While the reformed monetary regimes where QE is used
intensively can improve economic stability, it works better in a combination with either NGDPT or PLT.
In the latter 2 cases, there are almost no crises. This shows that stability depends vitally on the choice
of monetary regime. If we adopt more and more regulation () in the hope of reducing instability we nd
that under the alternative monetary regimes, NGDPT with/without reform and PLT with/without reform,
regulation initially hardly changes or improves stability. However, excessive regulation can even bring more
instability. When the monetary regime is under the standard Taylor Rule or reformed, some additional
nancial regulation improves the economic situation, while a lot of regulation worsens the economic situation,
bringing a higher frequency of crises, which are also longer and deeper.
Figure 4 shows the overall stability for each monetary regime, where we use 1frequency + 0:5length + 2depth
as a measure of overall stability. Again we see that some regulation, in the form of  = 0:2; is best for
the original and reformed monetary regimes, but does not improve the more stabilising regimes. As  rises
further all regimes are destabilised.
These experiments show that it is important to choose a good monetary regime if one wants to minimise
economic instability. In addition, adding some regulation does improve stability for poorly stabilising mone-
tary policy rules. However, for highly stabilising rules, regulation (with  > 0) does not add stability. Under
all monetary rules regulation, as it rises beyond some moderate level, progressively worsens stability.
What this suggests is that if governments prove able to undertake only moderately e¤ective monetary
reforms, as exemplied by our reformedcolumn, then they will, given their concern for stability, also choose
some degree of regulation (such as  = 0:2). However central banks will implement much heavier regulation
in practice, given that government has introduced this degree of regulation in principle. We have observed
both these tendencies since the nancial crisis, with the introduction of both QE (which we consider to be
the reformedpolicy) and heavy regulation. Of course we have not observed any of the more radical reforms
that we nd are much more e¤ective, such as PLT and NGDPT where the price level and nominal GDP
respectively are targeted by the interest rate rule.
What nally we nd here is that there is indeed a Policy Function resembling the one we assume in the
Institutional Model. It is quadratic in P with a peak of stability at a low level of regulation and it is shifted
upwards systematically by rising M.
We now turn to testing and estimating the Institutional Model.
2 Testing and Estimation
2.1 Data Moments
We consider the data sample from 1984.02 to 2012.02 for the US. The series are the square of the output gap
as a measure of volatility (S 1 i.e. the inverse of stability), the monetary regime (M) and the total percentage
change in the number of employees in the Federal Reserves over the sample (P ) as shown in Figure 5. M is
a proxy for the stabilising property of monetary policy. We divide the data into four sub-samples/episodes,
depending on the level of regulations and monetary regimes, as identied in our Underlying Model.
We identify di¤erent monetary regimes, based on Taylors speech at the panel on Monetary Policy in the
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Futureat an IMF event Rethinking Macro Policy (2015). His view was that during the Great Moderation
period monetary policy adhered to the Taylor Rule, but during the early 2000s, monetary policy was looser
than that prescribed by the Taylor Rule, and this caused the build up of debt and risk-taking. In response
to the crisis, the Fed implemented its unconventional monetary policy  Quantitative Easing (QE). Taylor
argued that this QE was a deviation from the Taylor Rule too. So if we treat the standard Taylor Rule as 1
(M = 1), then it can be assigned to the periods of 1984.02-1990.04 and 1991.01-1999.04. The period of the
pre-crisis boom 2000.01-2007.02 is thought as a poor Taylor Rule episode where monetary policy responded
little to ination and output gap and it is assigned with M = 0:5. The period from crisis 2007.03 onwards is
where the Fed used both QE and Taylor Rule, and thus aggressively responded to the low level of liquidity
and thus we assign M = 1:5 to this episode.
We use detrended data for our analysis on the grounds that there are likely to be omitted trends  such
as ideas about regulation and monetary policy, as well as world developments in trade and nancial markets
 driving all our three variables in the Institutional Model. The data is plotted in Figure 5.
From these episodes we construct a number of correlations between these series over the di¤erent sub-
samples (reported in Figure 5). We are interested in whether this data behaviour can be generated by our
Institutional Model. This leads us to the next section.
2.2 The Underlying Model and simulating it for each episode
Besides gathering the facts of each episode, we need also to simulate the Underlying Model to generate the
facts about the potential variability of each episode, which we obtain by bootstrapping that Model in each
episode to obtain the distribution of its variability.
To do this we need to create a corresponding version of the Model for each episode, with its own M and
P .
For the regulative behaviour in each episode we create a correlate to P in :We rate the periods of 1984Q2-
1990Q4 and 1991Q1-1999Q4 as having some but quite limited banking regulations, which we associate with
 = 0:2: These periods were ones where the number of employees was moderate. The later period of the
noughties, from 2000Q1 until 2007Q2 when the nancial crisis struck, is associated with very light regulation,
and for this episode we set  = 0; here the number of employees fell to low levels. Finally in the period since
the crisis, 2007Q3 until 2012Q2, where there has plainly been highly aggressive regulation and the number
of employees rose sharply: here we set  = 0:4.
For monetary policy we use the standard estimated Taylor Rule for the two periods of the 1980s and
the 1990s. For the noughties period we use a Taylor Rule with the response to ination and the output gap
halved. Finally, for the post-crisis period we return to the estimated Taylor Rule supplemented by a QE
rule, relating the credit rate to the level of M0.
2.3 Testing and Estimation of the Institutional Model
To answer whether the Institutional Model could be the data generating one, we need to simulate it to obtain
the counterpart joint distribution for the correlations across di¤erent data sub-samples. The process is as
follows.
First, we use our Underlying Model for the US economy to generate in each episode the distribution of
S. We need this in order to animatethe Institutional Model as realistically as possible with an exogenous
source of noise. Notice that 2E is not directly observable since it is produced by all the shocks in the economy
and these cannot be aggregated into a single measure of volatility. So in each episode we repeatedly resample
the innovations (1000 times) and generate corresponding S values, which we measure as the inverse of the
variance of the output gap. Once we inject the S into the Institutional Model it reads out an implied 2E
since the two are perfectly correlated in that model. So e¤ectively we are applying an estimate of 2E to the
Institutional model.
Our reliance on the Underlying Model is limited to nding the distribution of S in each episode. One
could imagine doing this in other ways using the observed variation in S during each sample episode and
bootstrapping a time series process for S. However, this would produce much less than the full variation
implied by the structural model in which the e¤ect of all the economys shocks interact with the reaction
of regulative and monetary policies. As our Underlying Model has already been tested for its t to the US
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macro facts over this sample as a whole, we regard it as given in this testing procedure, so that we are
in e¤ect only testing the accuracy of the Institutional Model. Of course the Underlying Model will not be
completely accurate; however, its inaccuracy should not materially a¤ect the test of the Institutional Model
because it will only a¤ect the precise distribution of S, to which the test is fairly insensitive.
From this process we obtain 1000 di¤erent values of S in each of the 4 episodes; we combine these
randomly into 1000 sets of four S values. We can think of each of these sets as a potential history of the
four episodes, so that we have 1000 sequences of these 4 episodes that could have randomly occurred.
We now carry the obtained S across to the parameterised Institutional Model, which solves for the
following observable outcomes for institutions as functions of the environmental volatility (with signs of the
rst derivatives):
M = f(2E+);P = f(
2
E+);S = f(
2
E ):
From these equations we can see immediately that each S corresponds to a unique 2E . We can now use this
Institutional Model also to deriveM and P: Thus we end up with 1000 sets of 4 S;M;P and 2E , one for each
episode: Then we calculate the correlation between these variables. Since S and 2E are perfectly correlated,
we take out 2E and consider only the other 3 variables. We end up with 1000 sets of 3 correlations. These
moments correspond to those we constructed from the data.
Lastly, we compute the joint distribution of these correlations. The Wald test statistic then is computed
for the data correlations, to determine where in this distribution they lie.
Estimation of the parameters of the Institutional Model is carried out by minimising this Wald statistic
through a search algorithm across the parameter space. This estimation process found a set of model
parameters (Table 2) that delivers a p-value of 0.230 which means that the model easily passes the test. In
Table 3 we compare the correlations from the actual data with those from the simulations. As expected, we
nd the the actual correlations are within the upper and lower percentiles and very close to the mean.
Given the assumptions that regulations were less strict before the crisis, relaxed during crisis and ag-
gressive after crisis, we do nd that the estimation can nd a model that ts the data and this estimated
Institutional Model can therefore be considered the true model generating the observed data. This model
suggests that regulation became more severe after the Great Recession; and that this increase in regulation
is also increasing instability.
2.4 Robustness Checks
The rst robustness check is concerned with the question of whether the estimated Institutional Model can
generate the La¤er Curve behaviour of stability and power. Figure 6 shows that there is a strong La¤er curve
e¤ect from rising P to S: the more regulation the lower the stability in the area to the right of the La¤er
Curve where the central bank chooses to operate. Hence we see from Figure 7 the e¤ects of general volatility
(2 on the x-axis) that as it rises the response of P is positive but quite muted; this is because although
the central bank likes more regulation, the cost of adding more is expensive due to further instability. On
the other hand we see that rising volatility causes the government to choose stronger monetary targeting
policies (M) because the gains from higher stability much outweigh the administrative costs of change that
contribute a negative e¤ect ofM to the utility function (it also wants but cannot determine a strongly rising
P because it is on the left hand side of the La¤er curve where a rise in P raises stability).
The second robustness check is concerned with our estimation. We need to check how accurate our
parameter estimates are. In order to do this, we perform a Monte Carlo exercise to check the power of the
Indirect Inference test. If we take the estimated Institutional Model as the true model of how the decisions
on monetary policy and regulations are made we vary the estimated coe¢ cients of the Institutional Model
and see how often an increasingly false version of the model would be rejected at the 5% level. Table 4
shows the power of the test; to create it we have varied all the Institutional Model coe¢ cients randomly by
+ or  x%, where the x is shown in the left hand column but obeying the parameter size restrictions of the
model (including non-zero), so that the model is always correctly specied. It shows that the power rises
slowly reaching over 70% once it gets to 80% false, where it stays until reaching the parameter bounds. The
Institutional Model only denes the relationship between three variables and with only four episode data
points; so the Indirect Inference test does have reasonable power given the limitations on our auxiliary model
and data sample. In other words, we can be reasonably condent, given that this model passes the test, that
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it yields policy conclusions that are qualitatively robust, in that we know that any model that gets close to
the parameter bounds of the specication will be rejected almost all the time.
Perhaps an even more important check is on the power of the test in rejecting a model that is seriously
mis-specied. Generally we nd that the IIW test has an almost total intolerance in this respect, rejecting
models with a di¤erent structure close to 100% of the time. The reason for this is that the auxiliary model
is some (often crude) approximation to the reduced form of the true model and if the model is identied
(usually these models are over-identied) then its reduced form will be totally distinguishable from that of
di¤erent models with enough data and even with limited data should be easily distinct  see Le et al. (2017).
We checked whether a model in which the central bank would maximise on the correct side of the La¤er
Curve (i.e. was not dominated by power-seeking ambition but rather but rather by the general interest)
would be systematically rejected by the data from the true model: we made the parameter  negative
instead of positive (i.e. the central bank now would dislike, instead of liking, P , the number of its employees,
representing its Power). Regardless of the absolute size of this now-negative parameter the model is rejected
by 100% of the true data samples.
All this suggests that the data support a model in which central banks aim to raise regulation beyond
its optimal level: any model where this is not true will always be rejected: this is our public choice position
about the behaviour of central banks.
3 Conclusions and policy implications
Many believe that more regulation would make banks safer. In his speech at the National Bureau of Eco-
nomics Research Summer Institute 2014, Stanley Fischer praised the rigid regulations of the Dodd-Frank
Act on the banking system. He said ...by raising the capital and liquidity ratio for SIFIs (systemically
important nancial institutions), and through the active use of the stress tests, regulators and supervisors
have strengthened bank holding companies and thus reduced the probability of future bank failures.... In
a similar vein, Neel Kashkari, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, in his speech at
the Brookings Institution in 2016 suggested a range of options to deal with an individual large bank failure:
...(1) Breaking up large banks into smaller, less connected, less important entities; (2) Turning large banks
into public utilities by forcing them to hold so much capital that they virtually cant fail...; (3) Taxing
leverage throughout the nancial system to reduce systematic risks wherever they lie.... He emphasised
the point in his blog on April 6th 2017, calling for a doubling of the banks capital/asset ratios in the
belief that more banking regulation by making banks better capitalised would prevent any instability like
that of the recent crisis. This view has been attacked in di¤erent contributions by Congdon, Goodhart and
Hanke (all 2017); they have argued that o¢ cial actions to increase bankscapital/asset ratios since 2008
have had counter-productive results. Banks have reacted by reducing credit and so deposits and the money
supply. This has worsened and prolonged the Great Recession, thus worsening instability. Furthermore
macro-prudential measures(alias credit controls) create market distortions and may be mistimed cyclically
compared with monetary reaction via rules. Central banks failed to prevent a large credit boom before the
crisis, failed to provide the necessary liquidity to stop the Lehman collapse and subsequently prevented the
necessary growth in credit for the recovery by draconian regulation. We attribute these gross failures at least
partially to central banks having concern with their own interests rather than the social interest.
In this paper we present an Institutional Model where, besides the choice of the government, the central
bank as a nancial regulator maximises its power through a strengthening of macro-prudential policy. This
theoretical Institutional Model suggests that given a monetary regime, nancial regulation helps to improve
stability only up to a point, above which it creates more distortions. We performed two exercises given this
model. First, we integrated the idea of a maximum level of regulation into a model of the US economy
to see the e¤ects of regulation on the wider macroeconomy. We found that in line with the argument
of Congdon, Goodhard and Hanke above, good monetary policy can e¤ectively reduce instability while
regulation destabilises the economy in the presence of well-conducted monetary policy. Even when monetary
policy is only weakly stabilising, regulation makes little contribution and risks being pushed to excessive
levels by central banks to satisfy their own bureaucratic interests. Second, to validate the conclusion, we
used Indirect Inference testing and estimation to see whether our Institutional Model could have generated
the observed moments for the US economy. We found that the estimated Institutional Model can be the
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true model generating the observed data. Its results suggest that regulations were rather too severe after
the recent crisis period. Such severity can actually cause more instability. We also nd that the data totally
reject the idea that central banks could be benevolent pursuers of the public interest, conrming that they
aim to raise regulation above its optimal level.
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Figure 3: Central Bank Preferences
Figure 4: Stability of Monetary Regimes
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Figure 5: Data (detrended)
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Figure 7: Response of Institutional Model to underlying stability
 value Original Reformed NGDPT
NGDPT
and Reformed
PLT
PLT
and Reformed
Frequency 0:0 15:291 11:429 4:444 4:402 5:816 5:800
of crises every 0:2 10:304 8:056 4:444 4:453 5:682 5:783
1000 years 0:4 16:830 14:317 6:221 6:465 7:079 7:323
0:6 16:903 16:669 9:207 9:608 10:034 10:368
0:8 15:769   12:142 12:527 13:855 13:376
Length 0:0 32:511 19:443 15:432 15:467 15:776 15:787
0:2 17:405 16:530 15:439 15:442 15:751 15:750
0:4 25:458 21:714 17:763 17:974 17:241 18:007
0:6 41:666 37:758 24:169 26:232 22:367 25:988
0:8 50:459   22:808 23:704 23:892 24:058
Depth 0:0 11:409 3:189 2:011 2:015 2:071 2:072
0:2 3:093 2:644 2:002 2:008 2:070 2:067
0:4 6:828 5:927 2:699 2:946 2:534 2:851
0:6 17:831 17:201 12:260 15:094 7:702 13:068
0:8 36:457   21:334 24:148 24:275 22:383
" " models do not converge
Table 1: Comparison of Stability
Coe¢ cients     b c d
Initial 1:5 0:5 0:5 1:5 0:5 0:5 0:5
Estimated 1:105 6:641 0:336 4:701 9:754 6:607 3:387
Table 2: Estimated Coe¢ cients
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corr(S,M) corr(S,P) corr(M,P)
Actual detrended  0:6689  0:6860 0:9997
Mean Simulations  0:7720  0:8376 0:9902
Lower 25th Percentile  0:9997  0:9997 0:9482
Upper 25th Percentile  0:0789  0:3082 1:0000
Table 3: Comparison of data correlations with simulated correlations
Falseness in % Rejection Rate in %
5 6:6
9 7:9
10 9:3
30 21:1
50 29:5
80 72:9
100 73:9
Table 4: Power of the Test
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4 Appendix: Le et al. (2016) Model Listing
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Taylor Rule
rt = rt 1 + (1  ) (rpt + ryyt) + ry (yt   yt 1) + ert for rt > 0:0625 (10)
Premium
Etcyt+1   (rt   Ett+1) = pmt =  (qqt + kt   nt)   mt + t + eprt (11)
Net worth
nt =
K
N
(cyt   Et 1cyt) + Et 1cyt + nt 1 + enwt (12)
Entrepreneurial consumption
cet = nt (13)
M0
mt =  1Mt + errm2t for rt > 0:0625 and mt =  2(st   c) + errm2t for rt  0:0625 (14)
M2
Mt = (1 +    )kt + mt   nt (15)
19
